Anselm’s Ontological Argument. Anselm’s ontological argument purports to be an a priori proof of God’s existence. Anselm starts with premises that do not. Anselms’s Ontological Argument is stated, and a few standard St. Anselm of Canterbury () was a Neoplatonic Realist and was. Ontological Argument The ontological argument is widely thought to have been first clearly articulated by St. Anselm of Canterbury, who defined God as the.
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On Aquinas’s view, even if we assume that everyone shares the same concept of God as a being than which none greater can be imagined, “it does not therefore follow that he understands what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally.
And, of course, they do. Anselm began with the concept of God as….
Philosophy of Religion
God exists as an idea in the mind. Clearly, if Anselm can establish the existence ontilogical a being of this sort, his conclusion would be of immense philosophical and theological significance. Not all properties are God properties. It is shaped by his central distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions.
Generally speaking, they are less formal arguments than natural argumen. God is, as a conceptual matter that is, as a matter of definition an unlimited being. The property of being God-like is consistent. See MalcolmHartshorneand Plantinga for closely related arguments.
Any reading of any camterbury argument which has been produced so far which is sufficiently clearly stated ontologicap admit of evaluation yields a result which is invalid, or possesses a set of premises which it is clear in advance that no reasonable, reflective, well-informed, etc. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.
The fool understands the definition of God but denies that God exists. But if a person p who does A at t has the ability to do other than A at tthen it follows that p has the ability to bring it about that an omniscient God has a false belief – and this is clearly impossible. On this line of analysis, then, it follows that it is logically impossible for a being to simultaneously instantiate omniscience and omnipotence.
Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: Here is a modest attempt to provide such an analysis:.
The existence of an unlimited anxelm is logically impossible anaelm if the concept of an unlimited being is self-contradictory. Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
Following the earlier line of thought, it seems that the argument might go something like this: Bibliography Primary Texts Anselm, St. Thank You for Your Contribution!
So, if man has the idea of God, then God must exist before this thought, because man cannot create aneslm idea of his own imagination . In what follows, we shall apply these general considerations to the exemplar arguments introduced in section 2.
Premise Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists. At this point Anselm wields what is perhaps his most controversial premise.
Epistemological issues branches of philosophy epistemology In epistemology: Most categories of ontological argument have some actual defenders; but none has a large following. In an attempt to resolve this problem, Plantinga differentiated between “greatness” and “excellence”.
Ontological argument – Wikipedia
This is a familiar distinction, even if the terms are not familiar. The Proslogion goes on and on, trying to establish the properties of that than which ontologlcal greater can be conceived. Say that a God-property is a property that is possessed by God in all and only those worlds in which God exists. Cognoscenti will recognise that the crucial point is that Meinongian ontological arguments fail to respect the distinction between nuclear assumptible, characterising properties and non-nuclear non-assumptible, non-characterising properties.
The S5 system of modal logic includes an axiom that looks suspiciously similar to Premise 4: It is hard to know exactly how to formulate it. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Plantinga himself agrees: Hence There is in the understanding a unique thing than which there is no greater. Unfortunately, our editorial approach may not be able to accommodate all contributions.
Likewise, cosmological arguments depend on certain empirical claims about the explanation for the occurrence of empirical events. Open Court Publishing Co. And only a claim that attributes a particular property can entail claims that attribute particular properties.